Summary

Pre-0.1.5 used HMAC-SHA256 over the (SHA256SUMS, index.json)
envelope and called it a "signature" — a misnomer. HMAC is a Message
Authentication Code (FIPS 198-1); the verifier needs the same shared
secret as the signer, so it cannot provide non-repudiation and cannot
satisfy cross-organizational provenance expectations.

This PR keeps the envelope shape and replaces the cryptographic
primitive with ed25519. The BUNDLE.sig filename, the
sign_bundle / verify_bundle_signature API names, and the SIGN_*
diagnostic codes are now legitimate.

Three-layer integrity model (now documented in SYS-001 + README + QUALIFICATION)

1. Content layer — sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS, no key required
2. Metadata layer — verify with 32-byte ed25519 public key
3. Provenance layer — non-repudiation via the asymmetric primitive

What changed

• crates/evidence-core/src/bundle/signing.rs: ed25519 sign + verify, key file IO helpers
• crates/evidence-core/src/lib.rs: re-export SigningKey, VerifyingKey, Signature, key helpers
• cargo-evidence CLI: --signing-key/--verify-key paths now read 32-byte hex files (was raw HMAC secret bytes)
• 1 diagnostic code renamed: VERIFY_HMAC_FAILURE → VERIFY_SIGNATURE_INVALID (total code count unchanged)
• Workspace deps: +ed25519-dalek (rand_core, zeroize), +rand_core; -hmac
• SYS-001, HLR-015, LLR-015 descriptions updated to match the ed25519 reality
• README adds a "Bundle integrity layers" section with verify/generate recipes
• cert/QUALIFICATION.md adds an "Integrity layers" section pointing at the relevant DO-178C §7 SCM language and FIPS 198-1's HMAC-vs-signature distinction
• evidence-core/test_count floor bumped 360 → 367 (seven new ed25519 unit tests in signing.rs)

What's deferred (PR-C, separate)

• cargo evidence keygen subcommand with refuse-overwrite + --rotate
• Default cert/signing.{key,pub} path resolution
• signing.pub anchor consistency check at generate (refuses if local pubkey doesn't match the signing key just used)
• Project-self keypair bootstrap + commit cert/signing.pub
• CI signing-key handling docs

For now, README documents an openssl keygen recipe; the CLI takes explicit --signing-key / --verify-key paths.

Standards alignment

• DO-178C §7 SCM requires "protection against unauthorized changes" but mandates no specific cryptographic primitive. ed25519 is strictly stronger than HMAC for this layer (covers all of HMAC's checks plus non-repudiation).
• FIPS 198-1 explicitly distinguishes HMAC (symmetric, no non-repudiation) from digital signatures.
• SLSA L2+ requires "digital signature" for build provenance; HMAC is not accepted by the SLSA / in-toto / DSSE chain. ed25519 satisfies the primitive requirement (a future SLSA L2 attestation wrapper is a separate roadmap item).

Override-Deterministic-Baseline

Override-Deterministic-Baseline: ed25519 swap rotates Cargo.lock
(adds ed25519-dalek + rand_core + curve25519-dalek transitive deps,
removes hmac), which rotates cargo_lock_hash in
deterministic-manifest.json. The deterministic_hash projection
legitimately drifts from the prior main baseline.

Test plan

• cargo fmt --check
• cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -D warnings
• cargo test --workspace --all-targets (all green; +7 new ed25519 unit tests)
• RUSTDOCFLAGS='-D missing_docs -D rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links' cargo doc --workspace --no-deps
• cargo evidence trace --validate (TRACE_OK)
• cargo evidence floors --format=jsonl (FLOORS_OK, 13 dimensions)
• cargo evidence doctor (all checks green)
• CI green on push (cross-host + Nix flavors; cross-time-determinism uses Override line above)

🤖 Generated with Claude Code